Congressional redistricting plans for Pennsylvania, with an emphasis on the newly enacted 2018 plan, have been evaluated for fairness and responsiveness to voters. This and other submitted plans that adhered to the traditional reform criteria of compactness and not splitting political boundaries have half as much bias favoring Republicans as the unconstitutional map of 2011. For fairer maps, it appears to be necessary to "antigerrymander" by relaxing the traditional criteria in order to overcome the political geography in Pennsylvania which apparently makes a Democratic gerrymander practically impossible. The methodology uses five statewide data bases at the precinct level and suitably constructed seats/votes curves. If fairness and responsiveness are valued more than political geography, then they should be made explicit criteria in congressional districting, at least in Pennsylvania.
Introduction
If redistricting is done well, there would be no elections using a flawed map and no need for subsequent lawsuits to overturn such a map. The focus of this paper is on the criteria that should be used by a redistricting commission rather than on criteria for challenging an approved map in the courts. In other words, how should the map be drawn in the first place rather than how could a bad map be overturned.
1 This redirects the more common emphasis of election law from the courts to the legislature.
The criteria of equal population, contiguity and voting rights considerations are required by law and will be employed throughout this paper. Beyond those, traditional redistricting uses the so-called neutral criteria of compactness and not splitting political boundaries, such as counties and municipalities. These additional criteria are written into some states' constitutions or legislation, but not uniformly. 2 While these traditional criteria, 3 if actually adhered to, would prohibit the worst abuses of partisan gerrymandering, they do not necessarily prevent unintentional gerrymandering which comes about from political geography as was shown for Florida (Chen and Rodden, 2013) . 4 This paper does an up to date analysis of congressional redistricting in Pennsylvania to determine whether unintentional gerrymandering also is likely to occur in this state. In Sections 2 and 3 it is shown that all the many traditional maps that have recently been drawn for the Pennsylvania (PA) congressional delegation would have resulted seen as legislative law, not judicial law. Cover (2018) is one of the many articles that review court cases.
in unintentional gerrymandering. Therefore, this paper advocates a different approach to redistricting in PA.
The premise of the policy advocated in this paper is that redistricting should be fair and responsive to voters. Fairness to voters means that like-minded voters with one general viewpoint should be equally empowered as like-minded voters of a different general viewpoint (Nagle, 2017) . 5 Responsiveness to voters means that a state's representation in a legislative body responds to changes in voters' preferences. Responsiveness is often described as having districts that are competitive.
If fairness and responsiveness are valued more than political geography, then a redistricting commission should be tasked with choosing a map that has the least bias and substantial responsiveness 6 from among the many that the commission could draw and that citizen map drawers might submit to it.
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Of course, this requires quantitative methods to estimate bias and responsiveness. Several methods will be used in this paper.
All methods have to use past election results at the precinct level to serve as mock elections for a redistricting commission to test maps before any election. Remarkably, many reformers prefer to ban the use of past election results. This is understandable if politicians are the commissioners, as they can 5 In America the different viewpoints are usually thought of as Democratic and Republican, although it is perhaps better to think of them as progressive and conservative, especially because the latter distinction includes independents and minor parties. 6 Whereas zero bias is the obvious ideal value, the ideal amount of responsiveness is a more difficult issue (McGann et al., 2016, p.67; Nagle, 2017) . 7 Courts have the threshold bias problem of having to decide how much is too much. That problem is alleviated for redistricting commissions that would only have to try to minimize bias, subject, of course, with balancing with the traditional and any other criteria.
use such data to aggressively gerrymander for partisan advantage. However, if there is an independent commission, the use of past election results would allow it to bring about greater fairness and responsiveness. 8 The estimation method used in this paper is based on the wellknown seats/votes concept. The Seats/Votes graph (abbr. S/V) is a powerful way to evaluate the fairness and responsiveness of a districting plan, as has been long recognized in the political science literature. 9 Specifics about how S/V graphs are drawn for the purpose of evaluating maps are described in section 2.
10
The S/V curve immediately reveals intuitively appealing quantities to evaluate bias, such as (i) the fraction of seats at 50% of the vote and (ii) the vote required to obtain half the seats; furthermore, it reveals responsiveness. 11 Other ways to evaluate bias include the efficiency gap (McGhee, 2014) and a 8 However, ingrained notions die hard; the amendment to the PA constitution (SB22) proposed by reform groups in PA banned the use of past election results even for the truly independent commission that they proposed.
9 Complaints about S/V graphs are that they are too complicated for courts to understand and that they are counterfactuals (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015) . Although it is well understood in the social sciences that counterfactuals are essentially estimates of events that have not occurred, semantically, the word subconsciously connotes that it is something that is contrary to fact. It is hard to imagine planning in any context, science or engineering or social science, that does not use "counterfactuals". See also McGann et al. (2016) , p. 221 for defending the use of counterfactuals.
10 The S/V graphs in this paper are more appropriate than those proposed earlier by this author (Nagle,2015) .
11 Although responsiveness is often reported when the statewide vote is 50%, for states with a dominant party like Maryland, the more appropriate measure of responsiveness should be evaluated at the mean statewide fraction. Likewise, bias may be better measured at the same mean statewide vote using a symmetrical counterfactual as will be discussed in Appendix B.
new measure introduced recently in this journal (Warrington, 2017 language that might be used in future reform laws to promote fairness and responsiveness to voters.
Seats/Votes (S/V) graphs for the SCOPA map
A seats/votes graph traditionally has the form of the number of a party's seats S for any percentage V of that party's statewide vote. 13 This general form could be used to predict the outcome of a specific election, but a seats/votes graph to evaluate a districting plan is different from that. To predict a specific election, one would consider the incumbency advantage (Gelman and King, 1990) Given the result of a past election at the precinct level, it is straightforward to add those votes for the precincts in a map's districts to obtain a partisan preference for each district. One might suppose that this would suffice to predict the number of A seats for the election being applied simply by counting the number of seats with more party A voters than party B voters. However, as is well known (McGann, 2018, pp. 58-59) simple examples show that this naïve counting is deficient. seat for party A. In this paper, each district is assigned a fraction of an A seat using the probability function shown in Fig. 1 . The sum of these fractions for all districts then gives the seat fraction S for the vote fraction V of the applied election. Figure. 1. The blue curve labelled party A seat probability gives the fraction of a seat assigned to party A versus party B's district preference (past vote fraction).
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The magenta curve gives a measure of the responsiveness of a district.
Thereby, each past election result provides an estimated number of seats for the statewide vote for that election. Figure   16 Party seat probability P(V) = 1-0.5*(1+prob((V-0.5)/0.04)) where prob is the usual probit function, here with variance 0.04. Results are fairly insensitive in the variance range of 0.04±0.02, similar to the 5% range often mentioned (McGann, 2016, p.59) . Responsiveness is quantitatively defined as R(V) = 1-4*(P(V)-0.5)
2
. More complex methods assign seat probabilities using a logit transformational model applied to past election results (Chen & Cottrell, 2016; Warrington, 2017) or Bayesian methods . I am less confident in the PVI data base which I only accessed through Dave's redistricting app (Bradlee, 2010) , unlike the other data bases that I acquired from PA department of state. It is surprising that it uniformly gives a smaller number of seats than the 2016 presidential election when it is based upon the average of the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections.
vote, then so should party B obtain S seats when it receives V vote.
22 (Grofman and King, 2007, McGann et al., 2016) The full S/V curves in Fig 22 A geometric measure has been proposed that quantifies the amount of asymmetry (Nagle, 2015) . That measure accounts for both the bias in the seat direction and the bias in the vote direction; this effectively removes responsiveness, and it give values of bias between those of the seats and votes measures when suitably normalized. However, it is not readily intuitively graspable and the sign of the bias becomes ambiguous for some S/V curves that are nearly, but not quite, symmetric, so it will not be featured in this paper. 23 The slope is the mathematical derivative which varies somewhat with the vote; values of R presented in this paper will be for V = 50%.
Analysis of Other PA Congressional Maps Conforming to Traditional Criteria
Between the time when SCOPA struck down the 2011 PA congressional map and the deadline that it set for adoption of a new map, many amici maps were entered into the court record 24 and other maps were also drawn by individuals. These maps adhered to the Court's directive that maps had to satisfy the with 50% of the vote. 26 Grofman has referred to such plans as stealth gerrymanders.
24 See footnote 11 for the court record. 25 These maps generally adhered to the federal requirement, critically reviewed by Hirsch and Ortiz (2005) , that population deviations be limited to one person in districts consisting of 705,688 people. This meant that each map had to have a minimum of 17 county splits, one less than the number of districts. With the precincts that had been established in 2011, this also meant there was usually one or more split precincts adjacent to each county split. It was not possible to achieve this degree of accuracy in my redrawing of the maps for analysis. My population deviations were usually at the level of one precinct, typically less than 3000 people or less than 0.5% population deviation. These small deviations make less than 0.1% difference in the numerical results for bias and responsiveness. 26 The Republican leaders' plan was not voted on by the legislature before it was submitted to the governor who rejected it after the report of his appointed expert that faulted it for not sufficiently adhering to the traditional criteria. The secondary goal was to maximize Democratic seats. Interestingly, it has been reported that it is mathematically possible to make all districts equally competitive (Soberon, 2017) , although that paper mistakenly describes that result as unfair when it is actually fair and completely responsive winner-take-all.
districts and an R value of 5, significantly larger than historical values (Goedert, 2014) . Table 1 also compares these preferences to those of other maps, including the one discussed in the preceding paragraph, which will be designated the Democratic Best Gerrymander (DBG). N9 is better for Democratic voters than DBG, at least for the 7s data base, and N9 is about equally responsive as DBG. The most striking feature of map N9 in Fig. 4 into a more compact district that does not split so many counties by not including the furthest fourth city; N3 remains responsive, but leans Republican with 50.3% statewide D vote for 0.5 seat probability.
District 11 in map N9 in Fig. 4 shows the extent to which one might have to go to provide a map that is very nearly fair and quite responsive by drawing in pools of more progressive voters.
In contrast, the major reductions in bias and gains in responsiveness are achieved by unpacking city voters. 33 These districts combine suburban and exurban voters and city voters in nearly equal proportions. Such groupings might reduce political polarization and the influence of narrow interests.
34 McGann et al. (2016, p.103 ) draw a similar conclusion about Illinois. However, it is important to acknowledge that the only way to prove such an assertion is to draw all possible maps, but that is essentially impossible given the astronomical number of them ). On the other hand, it is possible to disprove this assertion by someone or some computer drawing a counter-example map and map drawers should be encouraged to try. 
How and why reformers partly miss the mark
There is a vigorous redistricting reform movement in Pennsylvania. 35 It has commendably brought the issue to the attention of the public with many presentations and letters to editors. Together with reform-minded legislators, an amendment to the PA constitution (SB22) was introduced for both congressional and legislative redistricting reform.
Concurrently, the LWV brought the successful lawsuit against the PA congressional plan of 2011 which brought much attention to the issue and resulted in the SCOPA map.
The primary reform in SB22 was to create an independent redistricting commission following the California model to replace the legislative commission prescribed in Article II, section 17 of the PA constitution. The traditional criteria of compactness and not splitting political boundaries were already in section 16 of the PA constitution and were strongly supported by the reform movement.
36
The obvious question, in view of the analysis in this paper, is why should PA reformers wish to prevent an independent commission from trying to achieve fairer and more responsive redistricting plans by constraining it to adhere to the traditional criteria? This is hardly a new question. Based on their simulations (Chen and Rodden, 2013) wrote "Rather, we 35 The face of this movement has been Fair Districts PA (FDPA) which has included League of Women Voters (LWVPA) and Common Cause (CCPA). The author has been a member of a CCPA redistricting team that has debated the issues in this section. 36 Actually, there was an awkward drafting oversight as these traditional criteria only apply to legislative redistricting in Section 16 of the PA constitution, which does not mention congressional redistricting.
suggest that unless they are prepared to take more radical steps that would require a party's seat share to approximate its vote share, reformers in many states may not get the results they are expecting." 37 The empirical analysis in this paper strongly supports these authors' simulations and thereby reiterates the question.
An answer is that many reformers consider it repugnant even to allow consideration of partisanship in reform. 38 In addition, the PA bills to reform the PA constitution, SB22 and HB722, were actually much worse than simply ignoring partisan bias and competitiveness. Those bills would have prohibited their independent commission from even considering partisan fairness and competitiveness. They did this by prohibiting the commission from even looking at past election data and party registration. 39 The commission would thereby have been prohibited, not just by statute, but by the PA constitution, from estimating the bias of its map. 40 These prohibitions would effectively have precluded future court challenges like the successful LWV suit whose expert witnesses extensively used such data. How could a court consider such a suit that used election 37 Chen and Rodden in a NY Times piece 1/24/2014 based on computer simulations adhering to the traditional criteria in (Chen & Rodden, 2013) . In strong support of this statement, Chen and Cottrell (2016) reported that unintentional gerrymandering accounted for all but half a seat in the PA 2011 plan. In contrast, as an expert witness in the LWV case, Chen's use of the median minus mean measure indicated that intentional gerrymandering accounted for about 2/3 of the bias in the PA 2011 plan. My analysis of the data in that 2016 paper agrees better with this latter result, giving half the bias of the 2011 plan.
38 This ignores the reality that elections are inherently political activities that, for better or worse, are strongly partisan. 
SB22 section (j)(3)(ii-iii

Looking forward.
There is considerable current interest in writing new laws for redistricting in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. Given the present understanding of the public and the reluctance of a dominant party to relinquish any advantage it has due to political geography, it is likely that new legislation will embody the traditional criteria rather than the bolder criteria of fairness and responsiveness. While this will produce fairer and more responsive outcomes than the most heavily gerrymandered 44 Of course, communities of narrow interest, like those that try to keep open obsolete defense installations, may not be in the greater public interest. Also, some supposed communities of interest, like large cities, might be better served by being split so they would have more representatives to appeal to for worthy needs (Hirsch and Ortiz, 2005) , and there would be a greater chance for one of those representatives to be on a relevant congressional committee. 45 Cain (2012) has reviewed independent commissions and the balancing of criteria issue. Balancing many criteria, not just the traditional criteria, fairness and responsiveness, was exhaustively discussed by Butler and Cain (1992) .
46 Implementation for achieving fairness and responsiveness should involve evaluating many maps for these properties, including those drawn by computers and by citizens, as well as those drawn by a commission.
plans, a concern is that the public will be disappointed with outcomes that still remain unfair, and many citizens will then question whether all attempts for redistricting reform are futile. One purpose of this study is to help educate people as to the likely outcome of traditional reform.
47
Even if traditional reform is all that can be achieved at the present time, at least people will know why it did not live up to expectations and not conclude that redistricting reform is necessarily futile.
Even if it is unlikely that fairness and responsiveness will completely replace the traditional criteria in the near term, it may be worth thinking about how some progress in that direction might be brought about in new redistricting legislation. I
suggest that a reform law begin with a preamble "section P" that would include language like "(a) Representative government depends on elections that are fair and responsive to voters and with the general policy in Section P." The crucial qualifier "to the extent …" means that political geography would not be allowed to silence commissioners more concerned with fairness and responsiveness, and it would also allow citizens to submit 47 Another purpose was to convince myself of what many political scientists have been saying for years, and to do so in the particular context of Pennsylvania congressional districting.
maps that have a few more splits of political subdivisions than the absolute minimum. Assuming that the process would be transparent and that past election data could be used, the public could then evaluate the commission's draft map and call upon it to choose a fairer and more responsive one if need be.
Whether this would be effective would depend upon the vigor of advocates of fairness and responsiveness compared to that of advocates for other criteria. 
Appendix A. Two other methods for measuring bias
The S/V approach to measuring bias requires some modest math and it involves counterfactual analysis. Courts, especially Justice Kennedy, have asked for a simple standard as a prerequisite for affirmative gerrymandering rulings. This has led to several proposals, two of which are critically discussed in this appendix in the context of their performance on the SCOPA map for Pennsylvania congressional districts.
The efficiency gap (EG) is being advocated as a tool for evaluating fairness based upon only one election result without the need for counterfactuals and construction of the S/V graph (McGhee, 2014) . It does, however, propose a normative S/V graph for zero bias. An even newer measure of bias (designated ) also can be used with just one election result (Warrington, 2017) .
Interestingly, it does not provide a normative S/V graph for zero bias because it does not simply depend on S and V, but also on how the votes are distributed among districts.
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A measure of the intrinsic bias of a map should conform to the principle that it remain constant upon shifts in the statewide vote, at least for likely ranges of the vote. The EG suffers from discontinuous jumps, as has been noted by many critics, and so does the measure. However, these jumps can be eliminated for the EG by assigning statistical probabilities to seats.
Nevertheless, both the EG and the bias values vary considerably as statewide vote is varied for the SCOPA map, implying that they generally fall short of measuring the intrinsic bias of maps. It is shown in Appendix B that a measure based on the S/V graph satisfies this test.
The efficiency gap
The basic efficiency gap, to be abbreviated EG1, calculates the difference in wasted votes between two parties.
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The original paper (McGhee, 2014) then derived a simple formula in terms of seats and votes
where S is the fraction of seats won by party A minus ½ and V is the fraction of the two party vote for party A minus ½. When the number of voters is the same in all districts, EG1 and EG2
have the same value. When this is not the case, namely, when there is turnout bias, it has subsequently been shown (Cover, 2018 , McGhee, 2017 that EG2 is the more fundamental measure of bias and this Appendix will use it exclusively. An important aspect of EG2 is that it provides a normative S/V curve which has responsiveness R=2, twice as large as proportionality, and that makes EG2 conform better than proportionality to empirical election data.
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One concern with either EG is that its value changes abruptly when a district changes parties with just a small change in the vote for that district, which may even be balanced by an opposite change in the vote of a different district that does 50 An exhaustive set of variations of the EG has been considered in this journal. (Nagle, 2017) not change parties. However, it has been noted that each such abrupt change will be relatively small when there are many districts (Nagle, 2017) . Now, it may also be noted that abrupt changes in EG2 can be eliminated entirely if one uses the probabilistic estimate of a district's seat assignment in Fig. 1. This essentially uses the S/V curves in Fig. 2 there is a more substantial criticism of the EG to which we now turn. Figure 5 shows the values of EG2 versus statewide vote for the SCOPA map using five data bases as elections. The concern here is that the values of the EG vary systematically with V, indicating less bias when the political winds favor Democrats.
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It is then problematic to assign intrinsic bias to the map using the EG. The smaller EG for larger V in Fig. 5 is simply related to the SCOPA plan having greater responsiveness R (approximately 3 in Table 1 ) than the normative EG value of 2. As there is nothing wrong with a map having high responsiveness, this is the reason that one should not apply the EG, which includes a normative value of responsiveness, when evaluating the bias of particular maps for redistricting.
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52 Best et al. (2018) have previously found a similar result for North Carolina and emphasized this concern.
53 However, in its favor, consider the solid squares in Fig. 5 which show EG values for the actual statewide vote from each past statewide election. All five EG values indicate that the SCOPA map is biased in favor of Republicans. This is a stronger statement than what could be immediately drawn from the same data in Fig. 2 . It might also be mentioned that using strict proportionality with R=1 leads to even more variation in its estimate of bias in the SCOPA map than the EG. 
Declination measure of bias
We turn next to a measure of bias, recently proposed in this journal, that is also worthy of consideration (Warrington, 2017 ). If this difference were due to different geographical distributions of voters in the two data bases, the results would 54 Interestingly, though, it was been stressed that an advantage of the  measure is that it does not depend uniquely on S and V. However, this means that  violates the principle (McGhee, 2017 ) that a valid measure should register more bias when a party receives more seats with the same vote because, as Tapp (2018) which is located at 50% vote and 9 seats, as is a point on the other curve in the opposite direction from the center; in mathematical terminology, the two curves are related by a geometric inversion. When the two curves are identical, the common curve has inversion symmetry; it is unbiased by the symmetry standard because the plan treats both parties the same.
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Differences between the two curves in Fig. 8 can be used to define measures of bias.
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Here, we use a simple seats based definition; for vote V, it is the difference in number of seats between the two curves, divided by twice the number of districts to give the usual seats based value at V = 50%. This extended S/V measure will be designated B GS for Bias of Geometric Seats.
60
58 (Grofman and King, 2007) . 59 One such measure is mentioned in footnote 21. Instead, the measure adopted here is quite similar to the "specific asymmetry" recently introduced by , which also uses S/V curves and their inversions (called reflections in that MS). One difference in implementation is that their S/V curves were not obtained using statewide past election results.
60 It may also be noted that one could define an extended votes focused measure of bias B GV by taking half the difference in votes between the two curves at any fixed number of seats; this makes it the same at V=50% as the S/V vote bias in Section 2. Figure 8 . Seats/Votes curves for both parties for the SCOPA map using the 7s past election result data base. The curves are related by inversion about the center at V=50% and S=9. Also shown is the B GS bias. Figure 9 shows the values of B GS for a range of vote V for the SCOPA map for the same two data sets used in Fig. 7 . These values are relatively insensitive to V in its most probable PA range of 45% to 55%, varying by only about 15% in this range.
This implies that B GS is a much more robust measure of bias than the EG, which varies by more than a factor of 2 in Fig. 5 , or the measure which even changes sign in Fig. 7 . The 2016 presidential election predicts more D seats at 50% of the vote than the other data bases. It has been opined in the press that this might have been because the SCOPA map was purposely drawn using this particular data base. In any case it is interesting just how this data base differs from the other 2016 data bases. For each of the two data bases Figure 10 shows the statewide vote for each district at which its partisan preferences are equal. A district is then most likely to flip from Republican to Democratic when the statewide vote increases from smaller to larger than that district's preference. 61 Graphs like the two in Fig. 3 will henceforth be called flip graphs. The horizontal axis shows the statewide Democratic vote at which a district is most likely to flip from Republican to Democratic using the proportional shift method. The data bases are shown in the legend.
